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The iconography of heartland can be found in those terms describing or celebrating 
Australia’s wilderness and outback (Gill 51). Heartland serves as a mythologised place whose 
centrality can only be abstractly realised, for heartland—at least in Australian terms—exists 
at the edge of our more concrete experience of country. Economic value is often at the root of 
any contest over heartland. But as the imagined land at the heart of this vast continent, 
Australian conceptions of outback and wilderness might also be linked to more personal 
feelings of where one’s heart (metaphorically) belongs, adding further layers of investment in 
those beliefs that sustain or motivate the subject’s sense of authority over, or rights to, land 
identified by such iconography. These are themes that persist in many Australian novels. Yet 
any novel that engages the iconography of heartland risks inciting a false narrative of 
Australia’s vast empty spaces, for in somewhat understated terms we might say that ‘[t]he 
notion of the settler carving out their place and a place for settler society in the wilderness 
[…] is deeply problematic given the past and present presence of indigenous people’ (Gill 
48).  
In this essay, I will be using Kim Scott’s Benang: From the Heart (1999) and Peter Carey’s 
Jack Maggs (1997) to discuss narrative and emotions, or the role of emotion in motivating 
narrative events and the role of narrative in conveying and stirring emotion in the reader. 
Heartland functions in these novels in broadly abstract terms that enable the envisagement of 
heartland as both metaphorically the place that has one’s heart and the wilderness or outback 
of Australia. Heartland also serves as a contested site, either implicitly or explicitly, for each 
of these novels represent, thematically, a search for heartland in the sense of finding one’s 
place and establishing a connection with the land in terms of cultural and historical 
belonging. Whereas Benang addresses the assumption of an empty heartland and interrogates 
this ironically with instances of indigenous invisibility to white eyes (Scott 83-85), Maggs 
overlooks questions of Indigenous presence entirely in its story of a freed convict’s 
‘passionate identification with the England which expelled him [and which] leads him to 
deny the freedom he finds in Australia: “I am not of that race...the Australian race...I am an 
Englishman”’ (Hassall). Maggs’ identification of an Australian race seems ambiguous, but he 
is clearly not referring to Indigenous Australians. Rather, he means those Englishmen who 
now identify as Australian. Although Maggs eventually returns to Australia and finally settles 
in the domestic sense, the novel explores his anguished attempts to regain and sustain a 
connection with the land of his birth. In doing so, it positions Australia as a vast unknowable 
land at the outer reaches of the empire, thus rendering the nation as a whole, wilderness. Yet 
the persisting belief in the emptiness of the Australian outback obscures the presence of 
Indigenous peoples, and Jack Maggs achieves its obfuscation simply enough, as 
demonstrated by the term, ‘Australian race,’ in that the term refers to Englishmen gone 
‘native,’ rather than native Australians, and ‘native’ in the sense of having given up their 
native land, England, for a substitute, the colony.   
A narrative that situates Australia in these terms sits comfortably with the more conventional 
histories of settlement. The belief in Australia as an empty land is so entangled with 
mythologising accounts of Australian settlement that even knowledge to the contrary cannot 
kill it. It seems we are capable of believing one thing and knowing another—at least in terms 
of the uses to which heartland iconography are put to use (see Gill for examples of these 
terms in political discourses on pastoralism and farming). Any novel that seeks to contest 
such a widespread belief thus risks alienating mainstream readers. But narrative does have 
the capacity to overcome entrenched belief systems through what we might call second-order 
emotions. These are emotions that are realised through a process of reasoning. Their 
intellectual nature makes them doubly effective, for they represent the realisation of narrative 
structure in the form of emotion as a micro-narrative that motives the overarching narrative 
and constitutes its closure. Thus the larger narrative is encapsulated in the smaller ‘narrative’ 
of emotion that fills the privileged subject positions of the novel. 
These two novels are, in many respects, very different; and yet they might be connected on a 
thematic level, as I have suggested. In Jack Maggs, the titular character is styled as the ‘real-
life’ inspiration for the character of Magwitch in Charles Dickens’ Great Expectations. 
Maggs is seeking to reconnect with the young man Henry Phipps (styled as the ‘real-life’ 
inspiration for Pip). As in Dickens’s novel, Maggs has secretly supported Phipps throughout 
his childhood and into manhood. He has returned to England at risk to his life and his 
freedom, in order to make himself known to his beneficiary and to see the fruits of his labour. 
We have the narrative of a man seeking to re-establish his relevance to and within the society 
from which he has been expelled. In seeking redemption through reconnection and validation 
of his efforts in the figure of Henry Phipps, Jack Maggs might be said to be striving to 
establish a new relevance and influence, albeit exerted from the position of exile, and we 
might presume that he seeks to remit that expulsion. Benang, with similar motivations in 
terms of relevance and connection, describes the narrator Harley Scat’s search for people, 
culture, and heartland in order to comprehend a metaphorical expulsion/exile from society in 
broad and various terms and the related loss of connection with family and people brought 
about by a eugenically driven diaspora. The narrator in Benang describes himself as an 
almost weightless being that floats and drifts above his people (which include Indigenous and 
colonising peoples). As well as serving as a metaphor that usefully integrates the position of 
the narrator in the act of relating in terms of telling and also enabling him to actively relate 
himself to the events at hand, Harley’s disconnection with his people, family, culture, and 
society is signalled by his free-floating, which is anchored through song and storytelling. 
Indeed, although Harley floats comfortably within a manageable sphere above his uncles 
whenever he sings or he or they recount experiences, he comes closest to earth (and closest to 
becoming grounded) when he writes. 
Jack Maggs is admittedly a curious choice here because it is set in London, rather than 
Australia: ‘Australia is present in the novel only as the convict’s trauma to be called up by 
hypnosis: a hot, hellish country governed by inhuman punishments’ (Meinig 57). The setting 
of the novel is significant, however, because England is symbolically the mother country, and 
that symbolic territory is the land for which the banished Maggs longs. Further, ‘Jack Maggs 
is set in a city, or rather in the metropolis’ and the ‘Greek word combines the elements 
“mother” and “city” […], which allows Fredric Jameson to use the term “metropolitan” as a 
synonym for ‘the imperial nation-state as such”’ (Meinig 58). London thus stands for 
England as the imperial authority in this narrative. Maggs’ assertion, ‘I am not of that 
race...the Australian race...I am an Englishman,’ is significant for what it negates—that 
Maggs is not indigenous to Australia. He nonetheless occupies a subaltern status because he 
comes from the colonies: his Englishness has been modified in some sense through his 
transportation to the colony. This sense of modification is evident in Maggs’s condition as 
someone out of place (although uncannily in the right place at the right time) as emphasised 
by his gigantic stature.  
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Ross Chambers argues (in respect to a different Carey character and novel) that ‘the male 
monster is treated as a phobic object.’ Observing that ‘the function of the phobia is to 
suppress the attraction that exists in the homosocial plot between men (the male creator and 
the male creature) by making the artificial male an object of repulsion,’ Chambers argues that 
it is the return of the repressed that makes such monsters uncanny (Chambers 30, italics 
original). In immediate terms, the repressed person of Maggs becomes a monstrous encounter 
to be avoided by Phipps, who spends most of the novel evading his benefactor; but Maggs is 
also arguably the repressed figure of the convict who returns to London even more monstrous 
and threatening to the social order than he seemed at transportation. Although it is also 
possible to see (in respect to Maggs’s patronage) the monstrous and uncanny at work within 
the creation of Phipps as an English-gentleman, it is Maggs as the returning felon who is 
outwardly depicted as monstrous in form and in the violence of his manner.  
Given that he represents the return of the repressed in a national sense, it is not surprising that 
Maggs’s felonious presence in England goes unnoticed by the law, which sent him out of 
sight and mind in the first place. After all, it is Britain’s imperial authority that enables 
Maggs’s expulsion, and that authority is unlikely to institute systems responsive to the return 
of those subjects whose existence it refuses to countenance. If he is visible at all, it is as a tool 
of misdirection—and thus that he goes unnoticed—for Maggs’s return from the colony 
distracts the reader from Indigenous Australians, just as it also implicitly represents the 
imperialist nation’s distraction of attention from a figure so banished from narratives of 
colonial Australia as to go entirely unmentioned. Carey’s novel identifies the victim of 
colonial rule as the transported felon. In doing this, the repressed figure of the Indigenous 
Australian is substituted by the convict, enabling a deeper repression of the already silenced 
subject of colonial rule.  
Chambers relates the uncanny in Carey to the repression of homosexual desire, and we can 
see evidence of this connection at work in Scott’s novel in the form of Ern Scat’s sexual 
abuse of his grandson, Harley, who is also the product of his amateur program of eugenics. 
But if it is true to say that ‘[i]t is the denial of this uncanny return, in the case of male 
monsters, that transforms the uncanniness of the queer into the creepiness of something that 
is alleged […] to be preternatural (“beyond” the natural, “out in front” of the natural) and, as 
such, tinged with evil: monstrous’ (Chambers 30-31, italics in original), then we might see 
creepiness functioning in the homosocially driven repression by which colonialism engenders 
a new ‘species’ in the form of the (white) colonial. Hence Maggs’s gigantic stature pitches 
him as a Frankenstein’s monster—the product of an imperialist penal experiment—whereas 
Harley’s whiteness (rather than his Aboriginal ancestry) is what renders him strange: he is 
literally the colonial subject ‘artificially’ created through an engineered miscegenation. 
Interestingly, both these novel’s substitute white men for the figure of the Indigenous 
subaltern under colonialism: but whereas Maggs elides the deeper level of subordination and 
repression to privilege the victimhood relating to Maggs’s own position in the colony, 
Benang attacks the colonialist attempts to erase all trace of the repressed indigenous peoples. 
It achieves this explicitly through the narrative of Harley as the first white man born of 
Aboriginal ‘stock’.  
The repression of Harley’s Aboriginality initially keeps him grounded, but his whiteness, as 
the product of home-spun eugenics, makes him artificial and metaphorically inhuman, as 
suggested by his acts of levitation which undoubtedly make him uncanny. Harley’s 
emasculated condition further positions him within this uncanny framework of repression as 
he is rendered symbolically effeminate and thus ‘available’ to his grandfather’s incestuous 
yet mock miscegenation. Although the novel is troubling in terms of how it positions 
individuals like Harley, who cannot help the circumstances of his genesis, Harley is, in 
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Chambers’ terms, the scapegoat of this narrative of the repressed; but, I would argue, the 
scapegoating of Harley allows Scott directly to challenge any obfuscation of subordination 
and repression. By telling the story through Harley’s subject position, which is a position that 
has been situated within a broader cultural narrative that determines aboriginality to be 
‘regressive,’ the eugenicist (rather than his creation) becomes tainted with creepiness and 
Aboriginality surfaces unsullied by the repressor’s alienating strategies. That is, although it 
has been repressed in historical and cultural terms, Scott’s narrative strategy means that the 
Indigenous is not made monstrous, rather the charge of monstrosity is levelled at the 
Frankenstein-like creator of the child of mixed race. Aboriginality escapes the construction of 
monstrosity because when Harley’s behaviour and attitude present in terms that are morally 
reprehensible, it is ‘Ern's words [that] have fashioned Harley's thinking,’ which is itself 
racist; Harley overcomes ‘the confines of racist discourse,’ however, by ‘join[ing] a different 
social body’—‘his Nyoongar family’—and thereby ‘moves beyond racist, colonial power 
dynamics both by exposing racism and by participating in alternative forms of sociability and 
storytelling’ (Slater “Monstrous (Textual) Bodies”). In contrast, Carey’s third-person 
narrative makes Maggs the monster, and although it redirects the charge of moral monstrosity 
to other figures in this novel, Maggs does not achieve the same outcome. Jack Maggs remains 
a disturbing figure and his ‘happy ending’ in the colony of New South Wales sounds a 
disturbing note: Maggs is a creature of the Empire and his monstrous figure is reminiscent of 
those urbane jokes made at the expense of outback regions where everything (including the 
flies and mosquitoes) is bigger and better.  
 
Emotion and Narrative 
If Carey’s vision of the ‘Australian race’ is wryly mocking, Scott’s is disturbingly revealing. 
We might laugh at the suggestion that Australians are a race apart from others—bigger and 
better in the ironic sense of the joke; but the depiction of race in a narrative of miscegenation, 
rather than transportation, is far more demanding in terms of the emotional charge that it lays. 
Emotion, Patrick Hogan argues, is a necessary element of speech—feelings supply the 
motivation for speaking. As well as providing thematic feelings and motivations that unite 
characters and narrative, ‘operat[ing] to organize character actions and relations in narrative, 
[and making] thematic roles […] inseparable from emotion’, emotion supplies a reason for 
narrative: we need to care about the outcomes it gestures towards (Hogan 74). In the case of 
historical fiction, narrative emotion would seem to be a particularly practical strategy for 
political change. As Rei Terada observes, ‘If it is granted that fictions inflame true emotions, 
[then this] is usually explained by the thesis that fictional predicaments recall actual ones.’ 
But, as she continues (discussing Derrida’s approach in Speech and Phenomena and Of 
Grammatology), this ‘suggest[s] that we feel not to the extent that experience seems 
immediate, but to the extent that it doesn’t; not to the extent that other people’s experiences 
remind us of our own, but to the extent that our own seem like someone else’s’ (22). This 
suggests that narrative enables a potentially sympathetic internal staging of event. It supplies 
the passage through which one might move from being in the emotion to perceiving the 
emotion in a context (64). This entails taking a rhetorically objective stance toward a 
subjective response, and this position—though problematic and potentially self-serving—
introduces the possibility of construing the point of view in new terms. Novels like Benang 
and Jack Maggs enable the negotiation of complex feelings that might not otherwise be 
explored or fully understood. The potential for opposition to the subject positions privileged 
in Benang, in particular, is considerable, given that only a minority of Australians identify as 
Aboriginal. Yet Scott’s novel also has the potential to change minds.  
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I want to explore the possibility that the success of narrative in stimulating empathy comes 
from the relation that narrative bears to emotion, where emotion is a kind of proto-narrative 
that possibly accounts for the structure and range of narratives themselves (Miall 338), and 
that our familiarity with emotions as micro-narratives results in the motivation of narrative. 
That is, the resolution of events occurs in terms of feeling rather than other forms of closure, 
since other forms of closure represent literal endings as, quite simply, the cessation of events 
whereas emotion achieves its end by being felt or translated in empathetic terms and in ways 
that endure beyond the formality of the fictive event that ends the narrative. This might be 
characterised in simple terms as the way in which narratives are thought-provoking: they 
initiate a decision-making process that potentially results in attitudinal changes; these 
changes are initiated by empathic identification with those subject positions privileged in the 
text.  
Suzanne Keen tells us that research shows that, ‘readers’ perception of a text’s fictionality 
plays a role in subsequent empathic response’; it achieves this ‘by releasing readers from the 
obligations of self-protection through skepticism and suspicion’ (Keen 220). Fiction, in other 
words, has the ability to move us to consider positions we might otherwise turn from and 
‘[t]his ability of literature to move even those who are usually resistant to emotion may mean 
that literary narratives could provide a method for circumventing a person’s natural defences’ 
(Mar et al 830). Although one might be equally concerned about the uses to which such 
manipulations might be put, it nonetheless suggests that emotional engagement with literature 
results in outcomes over and above the changes to thinking and opinion that result from 
gaining new information. Our felt responses, it would seem, determine how we think about 
the characters and the issues addressed in a literary work and these thoughts—because they 
will be linked to personal experience where these are similar to narrative events—have the 
potential to initiate an empathic response to the events and alter a person’s attitudes to the 
those social issues represented by the thematic material.  
In other words, narrative emotion enables a sidestepping of what theorists call empathic 
aversion. We tend to hold aversion to the emotions of others when our empathetic response 
produces feelings of distress. Empathetic distress is a secondary cognitive emotion caused by 
experiencing empathy that is reflexively self-focused, rather than other-directed (Keen 208). 
This might mean, for example, feelings of shame, complicity, or guilt, all of which will likely 
cause the subject’s aversion to the emotion encountered in the other. Importantly, 
experiencing aversion to the emotional narrative of a literary work does not necessarily mean 
that the reader will experience the urge to react to those feelings. Jeanne Deslandes argues 
that emotional responses to fiction are highly ritualised and that, although there are 
exceptions, ‘the mainstream reaction […] is […] a learned passivity’ (Deslandes 356). 
Instead of acting, we experience secondary emotions that are reflective responses to primary 
emotions like fear. And it is, as Deslandes argues, precisely the cognitive nature of secondary 
emotions that make them ‘vulnerable to cultural influences’ (357). Deslandes views ‘emotion 
as a mode of understanding’ (338), noting that ‘[e]motion is a spontaneous reaction beyond 
voluntary control’ and that ‘[a]ll emotions are autonomous responses to stimuli,’ but that 
‘[s]econdary emotions are a subsequent emotional reaction to primary emotions. At first they 
are spontaneous,’ she tells us: ‘Yet salience does not lead to a reflex reaction but brings the 
issue to the will, which decides whether to react actively or passively’ (353-54). In other 
words, secondary emotions like those experienced through reading, are thought provoking; 
they ‘initiate a decision-making process’ (351).  
Novels integrate different cultural perspectives on the kinds of events they describe—whether 
these events are based on historical circumstances or not—and in doing so they offer scope 
for initiating and provoking in readers an understanding of the diverse positions available in 
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relation to such events through a distanced emotional response to those events. They 
introduce what Charles Sanders Pierce might call the virtual elements1 driving and deriving 
from the fictive emotions of the text: thus, and consistent with Terada’s reading of Derrida, 
the passivity of reading stems from the virtual nature of the experience. If it is the case that ‘a 
story only makes sense because of the emotions it generates,’ the emotions generated are of a 
special quality: they are what we might call virtually determined rather than actuated by 
events. And this means in effect that we are less likely to experience aversion through 
distress in response to empathy stirred by reading fiction (Vermeule 244). This is because 
fiction enables a focus on others in a way that might not be achievable in other narratives, 
although narrative in any form would seem to be particularly suited to establishing empathy. 
As Deslandes argues, ‘the chief characteristic of narrative emotion pertains to the fact that it 
is an emotion felt for the sake of someone, or something, else: a virtual other. Narrative 
emotion is an emotion by proxy’ (Deslandes 336). To place this in different theoretical terms, 
as Terada writes in summary of Derrida and extending the theory to all emotion per se rather 
than merely secondary emotion, ‘if one […] accept[s] th[e] duality,’ of affect and emotion, 
‘then our emotions emerge only through the acts of interpretation and identification by means 
of which we feel for others’ (Terada 21).  
Benang and Jack Maggs are thought provoking in many ways, but I want to address the 
anxiety that they relate concerning place—of being out of place. Each constructs characters 
that deal with this anxiety by attempting to re-establish connections with place and the people 
integral to that place. Further, although the places in these novels are real in geographical 
terms and this is relevant to the narrative in each instance—in Jack Maggs it is London, in 
Benang it is the coastal region in and around what is now known as Albany in WA—these 
designated places also have symbolic value. Importantly, it is the connection to the place’s 
symbolic value that, in emotional terms, is lost through expulsion and sought through various 
modes of retrieval. This symbolic value, I argue, amounts in these novels to a construal of the 
lost place as heartland or cultural home. As an experience known by many Australians, 
narratives about the loss of one’s spiritual or cultural home become particularly resonant. 
Thus the theme of heartland and its loss potentially stimulates in the reader of these narratives 
the (secondary) emotion of longing. And it is on these terms that we come to appreciate the 
positions of characters like Maggs and Harley. As well as introducing readers to new 
emotional experiences and liberating them from skepticism, fictional narrative enables the 
development of complex emotional situations such as we encounter in these two novels. And 
it is in this respect that narrative emotion has the capacity to change our responses to others 
by enabling identification with those other positions. If we accept David Miall’s findings, this 
is because ‘[e]motion can be recalibrated,’ it can be ‘evoked during conditions that are 
unfamiliar or unusual for that emotion’ (Miall 335). As Miall explains, ‘the literary texts we 
read evoke emotion in us, enabling us to match fictional or poetic situations to episodes in 
our previous lives, although this most likely occurs unconsciously—we often do not know 
why we weep during reading, or feel pleasure at a particular moment’ (339).  
The recalibration of emotion in the form of narrative empathy as ‘emotion by proxy’—an 
experience that derives from the virtual world of the novel—is largely possible because 
narrative gives embodiment to experience in speech through its use of metaphors. These are 
metaphors that enable the interactive event of reading and the enactment of virtual feelings, 
responses, bodies, events and settings. Metaphors of embodiment enable feeling by proxy. 
Whereas once ‘emotion was regarded as arising only when cognitive functioning broke down 
[…] an enactive view […] actively promote[s] the creation of an environment in which 
[emotions] can flourish or generate appropriate self-enhancing conditions’ (334). This has 
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consequences for understanding narrative in terms of the role of emotion in creating the 
worlds, subjects, and events that constitute it, where ‘each point of ambiguity’ invites reader 
engagement and interaction 2  and ‘represents a nexus of affective possibilities, a set of 
conditions for a structured, and structuring, development of feelings in which one feeling 
may conflict with another or augment another, or one feeling may contextualize another’ 
(Miall 334). Thus, narrative emotion, I want to argue, both motivates the narrative and 
enables the transformation (in conceptual terms) of metaphoric feeling into (a mimetically) 
‘concrete’ event. The concretisation of emotion as event supplies experiences with which the 
reader might relate in virtual terms.  
In the immediate sense of the term, emotion in narrative is situated within narrative as an 
internal characterological event; in other words, emotion is the interiority of the event of 
personhood itself—the motivating initiator of those performances within narrative that form 
the primary instances or elements identified as those actions crucial to the plot. Emotion 
gives the virtual its life and its liveliness. It does this by reproducing the widespread belief of 
body–mind duality that structures language and discourse (even when those discourses 
discount that belief). Interiority is an essential element in the meaning–making process and 
the conception of emotion as internal to bodily form is evident of the ways in which we 
distinguish affect and emotion. In lay terms, affects are of the body whereas emotions derive 
from the person as part of their personal experience—emotion supplies a reason for that 
experience, and such reasoning often conflates feeling and affect as a unified response that 
operates causally: emotion causes affect. Terada and other theorists (Brian Massumi, for 
example) might suggest otherwise—that what we call emotion is actually a reasoning process 
initiated to explain an affective event. Nonetheless, this generalised perception of affect and 
emotion bears upon critical discourses in that it enables a theorising of affect along the lines 
Ruth Leys describes in the work of Massumi, even though Massumi strives to unsettle this 
narrative of causation in terms of its directionality: ‘The “meaning” and “intensity” (or affect) 
systems are said by Massumi to resonate or interfere with one another in various ways, but to 
the system of intensity belong all the attributes […] of the nonsemantic, the nonlinear, the 
autonomous, the vital, the singular, the new, the anomalous, the indeterminate, the 
unpredictable, and the disruption of fixed or “conventional” meanings’ (Leys 352-53). In 
these terms, affect is non-semantic; and in being non-semantic it is effectively isolated to its 
bodily involvement: hence, it becomes eventful as intensity—a kind of concentrated bodily 
experience.  
In literature, if not in science, affect represents the bare description of bodily behaviour—
facial expressions, stances, physical reactions like blushing—whereas emotion performs as 
the interpretive and motivating element of the narrative: it supplies a reason for the affective 
response and both motivates the physical representation of emotion as affect and the 
subsequent actions and behaviours across the narrative. Emotion produces affects, in other 
words. But in narrative, the relation of causation is constructed in a specific way. And this is 
where the idea of affect as a non-semantic response is useful to me here, although I make no 
endorsement of that position outside the theorisation of narrative. Affect is given as a form 
that is otherwise empty of meaning (content) but it is conventionally made meaningful by 
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emotion, which becomes the content (thought) that drives the affective (bodily) response. 
Narratives of emotion are thus delimited according to thematic content and then according to 
that content’s effect upon form. Form is then abstracted to refer to the events that carry the 
thematic material of emotion, and not merely limited to sentient forms considered capable of 
emotion. Event stands in the same relation to emotion as affect, in other words. This suggests 
that event performs as a formal entity of narrative that serves to convey meaning. And the 
meaning it invariably conveys is formulated through emotion. 
Why might this be significant? Recall the empathetic response of self-focused distress. If 
fiction enables the reader to bypass any self-protective measures, then it makes room for the 
reader to contemplate what they would otherwise reject out of feelings of distress. Novels 
enable their readers to bypass any empathic distress and aversion they might experience in 
response to a particular emotionally charged event. Events such as colonisation and 
settlement, murder, theft, diaspora, genocide, eugenics, rape, and policies of miscegenation, 
fall into this category. But I can sidestep any distress I might feel as the descendent and/or 
beneficiary of such protagonists because as a reader I am invited to occupy a subject position 
that is substantially different from the one I actually occupy in relation to the event. Although 
a descendent of colonisers, Benang enables me to engage empathically with the novel’s 
thematic content (of longing for re-connection with heartland) because my second-order 
emotions are formed through the lens of aboriginality. And this enables a process of 
reflection whereby my opinion on a given issue (colonial settlement) might be reconsidered 
in light of the new position adopted in reading the novel.  
Point of view is important because we employ emotion in attributing value to the material 
world and this comes down to simple questions of orientation: how we find ourselves in 
relation to a given object, place or event. Keen sees narrative situation (which includes point 
of view and perspective) as an important mediator of narrative empathy (Keen 216). The 
world is ordered in specific contexts relative to our point of view, and our point of view is 
both literal and metaphoric: we engage the perceptual and the deontic elements generated by 
the metaphor of heartland. We are concerned about what we perceive to be happening and 
what we think ought to take place and our concern is a concern informed by emotion. The 
rhetorical condition of emotion (as the interiority of a particular [concrete] point of view) 
supplies the unity of motive that becomes the end toward which narrative makes: thematic 
material (longing, for example) produces material events (re-connection or failed attempts at 
re-connection). The reader is able to appreciate this longing, and experience (second-order) 
joy or sorrow according to how the thematic material is realised in formal terms: their 
emotional response thereby informs their judgment on the issue, leading perhaps to a change 
of mind. The effectiveness of changing one’s mind is nonetheless constrained by the 
convention of passivity. The energetic engagement that a reader has with a text will not 
necessarily be reproduced outside the act of reading. Yet it is significant in terms of 
influencing how we think about the events deployed in narratives.  
In these novels, feelings of longing and emotions of anger and sadness motivate the 
protagonists to seek ways to dispel their negative influence. Locating the cause of feelings of 
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frustration and shame in loss through expulsion, the protagonists seek re-connection with 
their heartlands. Benang and Jack Maggs construct narrative emotion in respect to a longing 
for two different heartlands perceived from two very different perspectives: London and the 
coastal region occupied by the Nyoongar. Both Jack Maggs and Harley Scat are native to 
these respective places—though the word stirs different associations in each context (largely 
because it activates in the latter context bigoted notions of cultural and racial superiority 
which have consequences for how native being is interpreted and valued). As a consequence, 
each character experiences expulsion in a different form—and, I should add, in a manner 
consistent with the historical events on which these narratives are based. Uprooting the native 
Londoner entails removing him to the colonies. The heartland remains intact and thus the 
point of view through which the narrative is given emphasises its primacy. In Benang, a 
competition for heartland generates the strife. Since the white perspective is directed by a 
longing for the unattainable heartland of Britain, the coloniser must establish himself as 
native to this new place through a reproduction of culture, society and place. Only then can 
he resituate his heartland. This entails uprooting the Indigenous people in order that the new 
and implicitly superior culture might legitimise its ownership of this new heartland. Dispersal 
(and dispersal in every sense) of the indigenous people is necessary in order to break their 
connection to heartland. In Maggs, the indigenous communities that existed in the colony of 
New South Wales prior to settlement are effectively dealt with by erasure. In Benang, they 
are given presence and the bureaucratic and social practices that have made their excision 
from texts like Maggs possible are brought to light. Harley’s own ethereal expulsion from the 
earth can be seen as the delayed effect of his ancestor’s actual expulsion from a specific place 
and their metaphorical expulsion in terms of the loss of personal authority brought about by 
this reconfiguring of native belonging. In Harley’s case, rather than actual expulsion, his 
experience forms as a feeling of exile generated by the denial of authority over land and 
culture and the removal of personal agency through acts of violation. Benang formulates 
Harley’s experience of displacement with far greater complexity than Jack Maggs therefore. 
Just why this might be so is apparent in the nature of Harley’s exile, which takes place within 
the geographical heartland of his people. Benang addresses the complexity of being in a place 
and yet out place at the same time. Jack Maggs, because it is about re-envisagement of 
heartland—a letting go of the old in order to ‘discover’ the new—is a narrative of turn and 
return: Maggs returns to his heartland, but must turn from it in order to return to the place he 
has left, which we might presume to now be his true cultural home.  
Identifying emotion in narrative is an important critical tool. Indeed, Patrick Keating suggests 
that narrative’s function is to play a supporting role to the stimulation and engagement of 
emotion: ‘Rather than break the narrative down into unity-producing causes and effects,’ he 
argues, ‘we can break it down into emotion-producing components, relating to the success or 
failure of the protagonists’ (Keating 11). Significantly for Keating, narrative is not simply a 
system for organising relations of cause and effect but an ‘emotional system’ designed to 
produce vicarious feelings in the reader. In Keating’s words, such a view depends upon a 
critical approach that ‘see[s] narrative as a complex weave of anticipation/culmination 
structures, including simultaneous, successive, consequential, and nested structures’ rather 
than as a structure comprising ‘a linear chain of causes and effects’ (13). Locating heartland 
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is the emotional narrative that unites each narrative in this instance—as much as it links these 
two novels. It is an internal journey intended to make sense of emotional responses to 
place—and it meets this need by giving account of these characters’ longings for connection 
and for place in terms that we might empathetically appreciate, even though our personal 
experience and political stance might be very different from that represented. This is because 
the concept of culture presumes a bond between a people and its objects—and it anticipates 
that this bond will be firm and unquestioned.  
Because our history around this pursuit of heartland is so violent and cruel, and our 
attachment to this land complexly drawn, the bonds of heartland are unclear—they have been 
ruptured, damaged, or poorly established—having been mediated by the violence of 
colonisation. Whether consciously or not, Jack Maggs engages Australian culture’s 
ambivalent attachment to the motherland, its anxiety and guilt about exploiting the new land 
(and the implicated violation its people, which is repressed in this text); and, significantly, it 
reconciles these through Maggs’s successful return to Australia. Benang, which means 
‘tomorrow’ in Nyoongar, is written from the position of that violated people. Its Jack Maggs 
is named Ernest Soloman Scat—not a convict, but a brutal, self-serving man: a rapist and a 
paedophile. These novels clearly address different concerns, yet it is telling that a man like 
Jack Maggs can be sympathetically drawn in a narrative motivated by the emotional 
confusion of cultural displacement, integration and assimilation that Australian culture 
represents. If it succeeds it is because it draws on this culture’s Anglo-colonial past and on 
contemporary sympathy for the convict as the petty thief turned criminal through privation 
and transported in violence to a violent land. Whereas Jack Maggs enables a sympathetic 
reading of convict settlement and longing for homeland, Benang successfully mediates 
indigenous peoples’ longing for heartland. But as well as reflecting the positions and points 
of view of Indigenous Australians and locating the white man’s longing for place in eugenics 
and other brutalities, Benang offers the possibility of a wider perspective of heartland as the 
site for future reconciliation, which we might achieve by turning towards that symbolic 
territory suggested in this novel’s title, Benang.  
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